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governed by individual and varying philosophies of crime control
rather than by an orderly and consistent approach for the judiciary
as a whole." 6 Thus, in North Carolina a trial judge remains free
to follow such maxims as the one cited by the supreme court in
1925, "The deterrence theory is the kingdom of the criminal law."' 7
But, quite aside from differences in active philosophies, the more
frightening, though hopefully more rare, possibility exists for arbitrary and emotional judgments or simple mistake."s This is not to
suggest that all discretion should be taken from the trial judge but
rather that the objective should be "to provide a technique whereby
discretion shall be allowed ample creative scope and yet be subject
to some degree of discipline."5 Without such discipline trial judges
are left in a lonely position indeed and respect for the law on the
part of those who come under its scrutiny suffers.
MARTIN

N.

ERWIN

Criminal Law-Nolle Prosequi With Leave-Possibility of Abuse
On February 24, 1964, an Orange County grand jury indicted
Peter Klopfer for a trespass that had occurred on January 3, 1964.
The defendant entered a plea of not guilty during a special criminal
session of Orange County Superior Court in March, 1964. The
jury was unable to agree on a verdict, and a mistrial was declared.
The defendant was ordered to return for retrial during the same
session, but the case was not reached at this time. Approximately
one year later the solicitor indicated to the defendant's attorney
that he intended to have a nolle prosequi1 with leave entered. At
" Bennett, The Sentence-Its Relation to Crime and Rehabilitation, 1960
U. ILL. L.F. 500.
= State v. Swindell, 189 N.C. 151, 155, 126 S.E. 417, 418 (1925).
In Stubbs it should be noted that the trial judge obviously intended to
fix the sentence on the lower end of the permitted scale. In view of the
fact that the old statute allowed a fifty-five year range of discretion, almost

any factor could have caused him to add two. years to the minimum. It is
at least open to speculation that under the new statute the sentence would
have been fixed at the lower end of the new scale, yet under the existing
system the judicary must leave the correction of its mistakes to other
branches of government.
"' Second Circuit Court of Appeals Judicial Conference, Appellate Re-

view of Sentences, 32 F.R.D. 249, 273 (1962).
'Nolle prosequi will hereinafter be abbreviated as nol. pros.
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the April, 1965, session, the defendant in open court opposed the
entry of a no!. pros. with leave to the trespass charge. The court
indicated its approval of a nol. pros. with leave, but the solicitor
then asked that the case be retained in its trial docket status. The
case was not listed on the trial calendar for the August, 1965, session, and the defendant filed a motion to ascertain its status. The
case was considered during the August, 1965, session, and the
solicitor's motion for entry of a nol. pros. with leave was allowed
over the defendant's objection. The defendant appealed, contending
that the entry of a nol. pros. with leave under the circumstances
of the case deprived him of the right to a speedy trial secured to
him by the constitutions of North Carolina and the United States.
The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the solicitor and the
trial judge followed customary procedure in entering the nol. pros.
with leave and that their discretion was not reviewable under the
facts disclosed by the record.2
It is well settled in North Carolina that the entry of a nol. pros.
is not an acquittal and does not bar a subsequent prosecution of the
defendant for the same offense.3
A nol. pros. in criminal proceedings is nothing but a declaration
on the part of the prosecuting officer that he will not at that
time prosecute the suit further. Its effect is to put the defendant
without day; that is, he is discharged and permitted to leave the
court without entering into a recognizance to appear at any other
time . . . but it does not operate as an acquittal, for he may

afterwards be again indicted for the same offense, or fresh process may be issued against him upon the same indictment, and
he may be tried upon it.4
The solicitor or prosecuting officer normally decides when a nol.
pros. will be entered. The solicitor has a discretionary power with
respect to a nol. pros., and he is responsible for its proper exercise.5
The court will not usually interfere with the decisions of the solicitor unless his power is used oppressively.' However, since the
State v. Klopfer, 266 N.C. 349, 145 S.E.2d 909, cert. granted, (1966).

U.S.

See, e.g., State v. Smith, 170 N.C. 742, 87 S.E. 98 (1915); State v.
McNeill, 10 N.C. 183 (1824).
'State v. Thornton, 35 N.C. 256, 257-58 (1852). See Wilkinson v.
Wilkinson, 159 N.C. 265, 266, 74 S.E. 740, 741 (1912).
'State v. Thompson, 10 N.C. 613 (1825).
6Ibid.
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solicitor acts under the control of the court,' the entry of a nol. pros.
is always subject to final approval and assent of the court.'
Where a nol. pros. has been entered, neither the solicitor nor
the clerk can order an arrest order issued without permission of
the court.' This restraint is placed on the power of the solicitor to
issue new process in order to prevent any abuse or oppression. 10
However, this restriction can be circumvented by the judge's discretionary entry of leave with the nol. pros.: leave may be given
by the court at the time the nol. pros. is entered empowering the
solicitor to issue another capias when and if he deems it proper to
do soi without further permission of the court. A nol. pros. with
leave authorizes the clerk to issue a new arrest order at the request
of the solicitor."2
There are basically three legitimate uses for the nol. pros. or
the nol. pros. with leave in North Carolina.
(1) There is a statutorily prescribed use of a nol. pros. with
leave in all criminal actions where an indictment has been pending
for two terms of criminal court, the defendant has not been apprehended, and a nol. pros. has not been entered.' 3
(2) The solicitor may enter a nol. pros. with or without leave
against one or more multiple defendants in a case in order to obtain
testimony against co-defendants.' 4
'State v. Conly, 130 N.C. 683, 684, 41 S.E. 534, 540 (1902); State v.
Moody, 69 N.C. 529, 531 (1873).
'N.C. Att'y Gen. Ruling, Letter of Oct. 7, 1953.
' State v. Smith, 129 N.C. 546, 547, 40 S.E. 1 (1901); State v. Thornton,
35 N.C. 256, 258 (1852).
"0 Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 159 N.C. 265, 267, 74 S.E. 740, 741 (1912);
State v. Thornton, 35 N.C. 256, 258 (1852).
"1State v. Smith, 129 N.C. 546, 547, 40 S.E. 1 (1901).
12
1d. at 547, 40 S.E. at 1. N.C. Att'y Gen. Ruling, Letter of Feb. 18,
1947.
"SN.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-175 (1965):
A nolle prosequi "with leave" shall be entered in all criminal actions
in which the indictment has been pending for two terms of court and
the defendant has not been apprehended and in which a nolle prosequi
has not been entered, unless the judge for good cause shown shall
order otherwise. The clerk of the superior court shall issue a capias
for the arrest of any defendant named in any criminal action in
which a nolle prosequi has been entered when he has reasonable
ground for believing that such defendant may be arrested or upon the
application of the solicitor of the district. ...
1' See, e.g., State v. Bullard, 253 N.C. 809, 810, 117 S.E.2d 722, 723
(1961) (defendant's objection to solicitor's entering a nol. pros. against
another defendant in order to obtain testimony against objecting defendant
overruled); State v. Ammons, 204 N.C. 753, 758, 169 S.E. 631, 633 (1933)
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(3) A nol. pros. with or without leave may be entered by the
solicitor if he finds available evidence insufficient to support a conviction. 15
The North Carolina court has said that if the trial judge thinks
it proper to grant leave at the time the nol. pros. is entered, it does
not see why he may not do so.' However, the court clearly implies
that the use of the nol. pros. with leave should be limited to cases
where it is "necessary to so use it as to bring offenders to trial
and justice.'

17

Since the entry of a nol. pros. does not terminate the prosecution on the indictment, the court has held that the two-year statute
of limitations for misdemeanors is tolled.' Thus it does not matter
when the trial takes place provided the bill of indictment was seasonably returned.' 9
The defendant in State v. Klopfer contended that the entry of
the nol. pros. with leave was an arbitrary refusal by the state to
prosecute the charge pending against him and, as such, deprived
him of his right to a speedy trial.2"
(entry of nol. pros. with leave in the presence of the jury as to some
defendants not prejudicial to the remaining defendants).
1 State v. Furmage, 250 N.C. 616, 622, 109 S.E.2d 563, 568 (1959)
(discretionary power solicitor may exercise prior to prosecution).
"oState v. Smith, 129 N.C. 546, 548, 40 S.E. 1 (1901).
17
Id. at 547-48, 40 S.E. at 1. The defendant in Klopfer was not at
large, nor was the state attempting to elicit testimony against any co-defendants. The only apparent legitimate basis for entering the noL. pros. with
leave was a lack of sufficient evidence to convict the defendant. However,
there was no indication that all possible evidence concerning the alleged
offense was not at hand during the eighteen months between indictment
and the entry of the not. pros. with leave. The defendant did not deny his
act, but contended that any trespass conviction in this case would be contrary to recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court. See note
20 infra. At least one state court has held that the court should refuse to
allow a not. pros. to be entered where the defendant is entitled to an acquittal. State v. Deso, 110 Vt. 1, 1 A.2d 710 (1938).
1 State v. Williams, 151 N.C. 660, 661, 65 S.E. 908, 909 (1909).
' Id.at 661, 65 S.E. at 909; N.C. Att'y Gen. Ruling, Letter of Nov. 6,
1941.
2-266 N.C. 349, 350, 145 S.E.2d 909, 910 (1966). The motion in Klopfer
objected to the entry of a nol. pros. with leave and asked that the case be
permanently concluded. The motion contended
that the continued pendency of said charge against the defendant is
causing substantial and recurring problems in regard to the defendant's scheduling lecture and conference trips outside the State of
North Carolina and trips outside the United States in connection
with research projects of the defendant, said defendant being a Professor of Zoology at Duke University and said research projects
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Article I, section 35 of the Constitution of North Carolina
provides:
All courts shall be open; and every person for an injury done
him in his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy
by due course of law,2 and right and justice administered without
sale, denial or delay. '
The North Carolina court has asserted that the right of a person accused of a crime to a speedy trial is a right guaranteed to all
people basing their system of jurisprudence on the principles of
common law.22 In State v. Patton23 the court said that the right
to a speedy trial has been guaranteed since the Magna Carta and
is embodied in the sixth amendment and in the North Carolina
Constitution. The right to a speedy trial is expressly designed to
prohibit arbitrary and oppressive delays that might be caused by
the prosecution. 24 In State v. Lowry 2' the North Carolina court
found federal protection of the right to a speedy trial unnecessary
since the "fundamental law" of North Carolina fully secures to a
defendant the right to a speedy trial. The determination of whether
a speedy trial is afforded has to be determined in the light of the
circumstances of each case, and the court has discretion in deciding
what is a fair and reasonable time. 6
The Supreme Court of the United States has not held expressly
that the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial is made mandatory
in state proceedings. However, the court has held that most of the
other sixth amendment rights are binding on the states through the
fourteenth amendment,"7 and at least one lower federal court has
including projects for the Defense Department of the United States
Government ....
The defendant's motion asserted that prosecution of the trespass offense
was barred by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Blow v.
North Carolina, 379 U.S. 684 (1965), and Hamm v. City of Rock Hill,
379 1U.S. 306 (1964).
" Emphasis added. This section applies to both criminal and civil actions. See, e.g., State v. Pope, 257 N.C. 326, 330, 126 S.E.2d 126, 129
(1962); State v. Godwin, 216 N.C. 49, 59, 3 S.E.2d 347, 352 (1939). See
N.C. CoNsT. art. I, § 17.
22 State v. Webb, 155 N.C. 426, 429, 70 S.E. 1064, 1065
(1911).
2 260 N.C. 359, 363, 132 S.E.2d 891, 894 (1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S.
956 (1964).
Id. at 364, 132 S.E.2d at 894.
"2263 N.C. 536, 542, 139 S.E.2d 870, 874 (1965).
"Ibid. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-10 (1965), requiring speedy trial or
discharge on commitment for felony.
See, e.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (confrontation of
21

27
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held that the federal guarantee of a speedy trial applies to the
28

states.
There is something of a practical conflict between the right of
to a speedy trial and the use of a nol. pros. with or
defendant
a
without leave, and it is obvious from the nature of the nol. pros.
with leave 28 that it presents possibilities of abuse if granted indiscriminately by the court. This is especally so where it is employed
3
A
on the grounds of lack of sufficient evidence for conviction.
flaw in the scheme of criminal procedure that has the potential of
denying a defendant the right to a speedy trial is pointed out by
the situation in Klopfer. It would seem to be a practical and realistic
solution to the problems of both the state and the defendant to
require the solicitor, when his application for permission to enter
a nol. pros. with leave is challenged by the defendant, to show just
cause for such an entry that has the effect of indefinitely suspending
31
The time
the prosecution and tolling the statute of limitations.
required for this simple, and doubtless infrequently needed, procedure would be negligible, but the effect would be to insure the
protection of a defendant's right to a speedy trial while leaving the
2
legitimate usefulness of the nol. pros. with leave unimpaired.
prosecuting witness); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (counsel
prior to trial); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (counsel at
appellate level); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (counsel at
trial).
28 Suit v. Ellis, 282 F.2d 145 (5th Cir. 1962). Contra, Phillips v. Nash,
311 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1962); Maryland v. Kurek, 233 F. Supp. 431 (D.
Md. 1964).
"' See notes 11 and 12 supra. The nol. pros. without leave does not present the potentiality of misuse that is present where leave is granted without a showing of good cause.
To prevent abuse, the power of the solicitor to issue new process upon
the same bill is checked and restrained by the fact that a capias, after
a nol. pros. does not issue, as a matter of course, upon the mere will
and pleasure of the officer, but only upon permission of the court,
which will always see that its process is not abused to the oppression
of the citizen....
Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, .159 N.C..265, 267, 74 S.E. 740, 741 (1912).
" This situation opens the door to potential harassment of the defendant by the prosecution. In cases where a nol. pros. without leave is entered
practically precluded.
this possibility is
21 See notes 3, 18 & 19 supra.
"In order for a defendant to obtain a continuance to have additional
time to prepare for trial, the reasons for such delay must be fully established. The court has indicated that it is desirable, if not necessary, that
an application for a continuance be supported by an affidavit showing sufficient grounds for the continuance. See State v. Gibson, 229 N.C. 497, 501,
50 S.E.2d 520, 523 (1948); State v. Banks, 204 N.C. 233, 237, 167 S.E.
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The question of whether a speedy trial has been afforded a
defendant is a determination that must be made on a case-by-case
basis,"3 but it is important to provide a safeguard in advance where
practicably possible so that this issue will not arise.

J.

TROY SMITH, JR.

Damages-Contractual Limitation of Liability
If a purchaser of real estate is required to put up a good faith
deposit before the sale is confirmed, he may provide in the sales
contract that if he fails to purchase the property, the deposit shall
be forfeited to the seller as liquidated damages. If the purchaser
does default, what damages will the seller be able to obtain if the
property is later sold at such a low price that the difference between
the original and second sale prices is greater than the amount of
deposit that the buyer forfeited? A court has the following alternatives :'
(1) To treat the stipulated sum retained as liquidated damages
and limit the plaintiff's (seller's) recovery to that amount regardless of whether the actual damages suffered were more or less.
Designating the sum liquidated damages primarily benefits the plaintiff (seller) by entitling him to his pre-estimation of his probable
damages upon a showing of the breach without the necessity of
proving actual damages and incidentally benefits the defendant
(buyer) by setting his minimum and maximum liability.
(2) To treat the stipulated sum retained as a penalty and allow
the plaintiff (seller) to recover his provable actual damages sustained because of the breach. Designating the sum a penalty primarily benefits the defendant (buyer) by placing upon the plaintiff
(seller) the additional burden of establishing his actual damages,
which are almost always lower, and incidentally benefits the plaintiff (seller) by removing the maximum limit to liability of the
defendant (buyer).
851, 852 (1933); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-176, -177 (1953), -175 (Supp.
1965). The requisite of good cause that a defendant must show to obtain
a continuance apparently is not required in actual practice of a solicitor
when he seeks a nol pros. with leave.
"' See note 26 supra.

'For a general discussion of these alternatives, see 5
TRAcTS §§ 781A, 790 (3d ed. 1961).
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